The self-help approach to housing aims at creating an enabling environment. An environment in which occupants of a piece of land, especially the poor, build their affordable houses fulfilling their current needs and progressively expand and/or improve the house to meet their changing needs. The Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka 'aided' self-help incorporated participation in decisionmaking, support for planning, design, construction, and financing. The project further expanded to enhance skills of settlement residents for taking-up community contracts for construction of community assets. Currently when relocation of slum dwellers in built-housing is becoming the preferred option, this article very briefly revisited the lessons learnt and the lessons that could still be learned from the experience of the Million Houses Programme and of the 'People's Process'. It argues that an 'enabling environment' for increasing access to housing involves multi-pronged support through facilitators. The experience of the Million Houses Programme offer insights, even now, into effective strategies for aided self-help housing.
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Introduction
The aided self-help approach for assisting poor households gaining access to housing, started with beneficiaries putting-in their own labour to reduce the overall cost of land development and/or house construction. This led to the provision of serviced plots with or without core-housing to enable incremental construction. Further, building material banks -often for recycled materials, small housing loans and technical support for house construction -were introduced. The other approaches introduced to address housing needs were in-situ slum upgrading, redevelopment and relocation.
Currently, slum dwellers in many countries are effectively being moved from land with high commercial value to dwellings 'provided' by the public sector. An overview of different housing programmes and subsequent changes in approaches in Sri Lanka to enable access of the poor to affordable housing shows that the current approach of 'relocating' slum residents rarely incorporates the successful processes or lessons learnt since the 1950s.
In Asia, several governments experimented with the different approaches for increasing access to lowcost housing (Choguill 1996) , which marked wider global changes in tackling problems of shelter for the poor. In Sri Lanka, the implementation of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (1978 -1983) , the Million Houses Programme (MHP) (1984 -1989) and the 1.5 Million Houses Programme (1990 -1994) (United Nations 2000) were to influence the approaches to housing globally. The programmes aided people in several ways to gain access to affordable houses, with around 60 to 70 percent of residents in underserviced settlements in Colombo benefitting in terms of tenure rights and investments in shelter improvement (Chularathna 2000) .
The enabling approach and processes of the MHP set a benchmark for aided self-help housing. The MHP was viewed as a "promising answer" to housing problems (Koenigsberger 1986 ), influenced housing policies and slum upgrading programmes and processes globally. It was conferred the World Habitat Award in 1988 and had immediate impact on the Global Shelter Strategy 2000 and on programmes of the UNDP and the World Bank.
Currently, with economic liberalisation and growing demand for land, there is an increasing trend in development of 'walk-up and multi-storied' apartment blocks for relocation of people from land required for infrastructure or commercial projects. In Sri Lanka, donors continued supporting the People's Process, that is, social mobilisation and community involvement through Community Action Planning, community contracting and/ or other community led programmes through the years.
Government and other organisations are adopting the 'provider' approach for relocation of slum residents and redevelopment of commercially viable plots. This raises questions about how lessons learnt from earlier programmes influence the current housing approaches.
This article argues that although the Million Houses Programme (MHP) provided significant lessons, the preferred route of professionals was mainly the 'provider' approach to housing. The first part provides the context in which the MHP was introduced. The second traces the processes through which various components were developed or evolved. The last part describes recent resettlement and upgrading initiatives that highlight what actions have been reversed, and how this is contributing to housing access. The article concludes that although benefits of aided self-help have been demonstrated and a decentralised decision-making structure exists in Sri Lanka, development and donor agencies have tended to adopt a top-down approach for relocation and resettlement projects.
Sri Lanka: Post-Independence Housing Scenario
Sri Lanka, where public sector housing activities have largely been linked with housing loan activities, provides a good example of the changing approaches to housing and options for aided self-help.
Government involvement started with the introduction of rental control measures in the 1940s followed by the establishment of the Housing Loans Board in 1949 to give housing loans to individuals and others. The Government's role on housing was limited to the lending activities of the Housing Loan Board until 1953 when the Ministry of Housing was established (Figure 1 ). The National Housing Department was established under the Ministry in 1954 to construct rental and rentpurchase housing schemes and flats, and promoted construction of houses by offering housing loans and making land available to Housing Cooperatives (Dolapihilla 2000) . The Common Amenities Board looked after slum and shanty improvement schemes, multi-storey housing for low-income groups (Dolapihilla 2000) , and took-up construction projects and repair of services and infrastructure when contracted by councillors. From 1970, the national government started taking up more urban management functions for "abolition of underdevelopment" (van Horen 2004) and introduced a wide gamut of solutions to increase access to affordable housing.
In 1973, the Government of Sri Lanka enacted the Ceiling on Housing Property Law No. 1 to address problems of serious housing shortage and deteriorating conditions of existing houses in the inner-city (Sevanatha 2001 ). Housing became a major government investment programme after July 1977 when the United National Party, whose manifesto explicitly articulated plans to introduce new programmes to improve housing conditions, came to power (Weerapana 1986 , Dolapihilla 2000 ). An Urban Development Authority (1977), a National Housing and Development Authority (NHDA -1978) and new public housing banks were established (Weerapana 1986 ). 
Making strategies on Housing, Upgrading and Participation
The first comprehensive programme for upgrading settlements and enabling access to basic services in Colombo was the UNICEF funded Urban Basic Services Improvement Programme (UBSIP 1978 (UBSIP -1986 ). The programme objective included empowerment of communities to organize themselves through self-help groups called Community Development Councils (CDCs) (Dayaratne 2003; Jayaratne 2005) . The UBSIP was placed under the Ministry of Local Government Housing and Construction, the Common Amenities Board and the Public Health Department of Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) (Sevanatha 2001) . The field staff of CMC's Health Department facilitated the formation and formal registration of CDCs (Jayaratne 2004; Chularathna 2000) . In 1984, the UBSIP was expanded (Phase II) to strengthen existing CDCs and to form new CDCs and 212 CDCs were formed during 1984 -1988 (Sevanatha 1999 . The systematisation of community participation through CDCs influenced future programmes of UNICEF in urban areas (Cousins 1992 ) and subsequent interventions in under-serviced areas in Sri Lanka.
The Urban Development Authority (UDA) initiated a Slums and Shanty Improvement Programme (1978 -1984) as a centralised programme for Colombo and a few other cities (Sirivardana 1986 ). The Programme included onsite upgrading of low-income settlements, sites and services projects, and improvement projects for which the normal planning and building regulations were relaxed (Sevanatha 2001) . The low-income settlements were declared as "special project areas" where households were able to construct a legally acceptable permanent house on plots of 37.5 to 50 sqm.
UDA granted a 30 years lease to those having irregular land tenure on plots not reserved for high priority land-use. The NHDA and CMC gave slum and shanty dwellers 'enumeration cards', a nonlegal document, when conducting surveys in Colombo's illegal settlements. The enumeration cards officially acknowledged the existence of the dwelling and increased perceptions of tenure security for slums dwellers (Velez-Guerra 2005) .The Programme promoted self-help and beneficiary participation in planning and construction, and tools such as Community Action Planning were tested during its implementation (Chularathna 2000) .
Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (1978 -1983)
The Housing Minister -Premadasa declared the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (1978 -1983) , which comprised aided self-help (50,000 units) and direct construction of houses (36,000 units) and housing loans for urban areas 11,000 units (UNCHS 1985) . Despite the political support, massive allocation of public resources, a new legal framework and new institutions to, 115,000 units were built in Sri Lanka during 1977 -1982 (Weerapana 1986 . 50,000 houses were built in rural areas through aided self-help, 30,000 in urban areas through direct construction by the private sector, and others were tackled through a "slum and shanty upgrading" component in Colombo.
The Million Houses Programme
In the early 1980s, when the Government of Sri Lanka experienced a slow-down in its economic growth and an escalation in costs of construction and of building materials, it had to reduce allocation (1983 to 1986) included operationalising of demonstration projects to improve shelter conditions, promoting community participation, incorporating training and information, and developing a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for greater programme efficiency (NHDA 1987; Information Unit 1985) .
The Task Force (1982) identified several strengths and weaknesses of the Hundred Thousand Houses
Programme (Sirivardana 1999; Weerapana 1986) , including: i) the slow pace, high construction costs, unrealistically high standards, cost escalations, poor quality of construction of public housing built by contractors, and constraints of finance, labour, and building materials;
ii) small houses did not meet the needs of the occupants and therefore households on small plots (less than two perche 1 ) subsequently encroached on public spaces, and iii) ownership and long-term leases contributed significantly to the process.
The Task Force recommended that the Government to play a supportive role for the next housing programme and implement it through a decentralised implementation structure, which recognised that housing constructed by the households were cheaper and better suited to their needs (Sirivardana 1986 ). In 1983 
Realising the shared vision
Several stakeholders involved in the implementation of the MHP, contributed to strengthening of processes for effective participation of the communities, capacity building and development of toolkits and guidelines for participatory planning and implementation. Further, a process of discussing and evaluating the experiences in implementation enabled midterm corrections and introduction of practical support mechanisms for the poor (Weerapana 1986 ).
The declaration of the IYSH provided an impetus for implementing MHP pilot projects as well as opportunities for collaboration and technical support for institutionalising the processes. A smaller working group appointed by the Task Force developed two types of pilots (Sirivardana 1986 (Lankatilleke 1986a; Sirivardana 1999) . It included: i) Site and services projects for relocation of residents from reserved lands, ii) Land regularization and on-site upgrading where land was available, iii) Common amenities improvement for providing basic services in areas from which residents would be relocated in the long-term, and iv) Individual housing improvement/ upgrading or repairing (Information Unit 1985 , Sirivardana 1999 ).
This was complemented by the Government, institutionalising a participatory process through which residents in under-serviced areas and with inadequate shelter would be supported. Two Housing
Options and Loans Packages or HOLPs were introduced (one for urban and another for rural) as a flexible and innovative planning tool. The HOLPs offered a variety of choices and solutions to shelter needs and problems for purchase of plots, or for construction or improvement of houses (see Table 1 ) (Pigott 1986 ). Further, the achievements under MHP were measured in terms of numbers of families that benefited from the HOLPs rather than numbers of (new) houses constructed. Each of these 'aided' families have better housing. Table 1 Facilitating decentralised decision-making
The supporting role of the Government at different levels (Table 2 ) entailed strengthening the NHDA and its sub-offices in 23 Administrative Districts (part of the Hundred Thousand Housing Programme) that were responsible for implementing the urban and rural housing sub-programmes under MHP (Robson 1984) . It required strengthening and the giving of support for the decentralised responsibilities to support families in making decisions regarding their shelter cost, design, materials and technology. This was achieved through publicity, workshops, implementation guidelines, training for NHDA staff and formalising of the 'People's Process', which evolved to facilitate community involvement. The Water Engineering and Development Centre conducted workshops on water, sanitation and urban infrastructure (Sirivardana 1986; . USAID provided housing finance support and technical assistance (AsDB 2000).
The step-by-step approach and delineation of roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders ensured that detailed information was collected on conditions of under-serviced settlements for medium and long-term decisions. By April 1985, manuals on 'improved wattle and daub construction for low cost shelters', on appropriate technological options for shelter and basic services, and on appropriate financial mechanisms, were produced. In addition, community based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, video tapes and slide packages for workshops on key activities were prepared 
Community Development Council
The Community Development Councils (CDCs) established to facilitate implementation of the UBSIP were strengthened under the MHP. Their role changed from organising communities to become partners who facilitated a participatory decision process and implementation of the programme. The CDC was responsible for making decisions to improve the physical and social environment of a settlement; plan community development work, participate in its planning, monitor and maintain relationships with NGOs/ civil society groups.
The CDCs became an integral part of a three-tier system of representation, comprising of the settlement level CDCs, District level District Housing and Community Development Council (DHCDC), and a city-level Housing and Community Development Council (HCDC) (Dayaratne 2003; Russell 2000) . The responsibilities of the HCDC as the apex body of the CDC system were to make policy decisions on the CDCs, decisions on development initiatives, and implement citywide health, education, social, environmental and housing programmes. The HCDC, which was attended by representatives of all relevant Departments and other government institutions, provided a forum for monthly monitoring of services in low-income settlements. This structure ensured a coordinated approach to the development of a settlement (Sevanatha 1999) . More recently, the CDCs played an important role in the post-Tsunami reconstruction process (BPP 2007).
Various dynamics were involved in the participation of communities that were identified during implementation of the MHP. It was found that communities had to confront the lack of flexibility of the bureaucratically structured CDCs, and that community groups organised around issues they wanted to tackle and disbanded or reorganised to deal with new issues (Benjamin 1986 ). Thus, although the CDCs played an effective role in implementation of MHP, many collapsed or did not function effectively thereafter (Sevanatha 1999; Devas 2001; Russell 2000) . A survey of 1614 settlements in Colombo in 1999 revealed that of the 625 registered CDCs, only 126 were functioning effectively and 100 were functioning irregularly (Sevanatha 1999 ).
Community Action Planning
The Community Action Planning (CAP) methodology evolved within the NHDA as a means for building community capacity and their participation in decision-making. The structured series of workshops that were conducted by field officers of NHDA for identifying socio-economic and physical problems and needs within a settlement, and for planning strategies to resolve them was formalised as a tool for community action planning and management (United Nations 2005; Russell 2000). Based on community requirements, one or half-day workshops were conducted to strengthen the functioning of the CDC; finalise and layout a block plan; formulate community-specific building codes; introduce the HOLPs, familiarize the community with procedures for taking up minor infrastructure works; and to initiate group credit programmes for income generating activities. The planning process in the settlements was supported by Community Building Guidelines established to maintain building lines, open spaces and control the placing of service areas such as kitchens and latrines. The systematic approach ensured greater awareness within the community about the problems, and the delivery of services was understood as a way of utilising and managing the available resources. The CAP process also ensured that information generated remained in the community (Dayaratne 2003) .
Although the benefits of CAP are known, it is primarily being promoted under donor-funded projects or for non-infrastructure related poverty programmes.
Community Construction Contracts
The involvement of the CDCs enhanced their role in decision-making, and led to the introduction of community construction contracts that were awarded to the CDCs to implement works identified through the CAP. The first community contract was awarded in January 1986 after a community expressed its dissatisfaction with the quality of construction of a well built under the UBSIP by a contractor through the conventional tendering process (Yap 1994) . The NHDA field officer was receptive to the community's request to build a second well themselves and facilitated the award for the work despite resistance from other office-based staff.
The successful completion of the well to a high standard ahead of the schedule led to NHDA accepting CDCs as possible contractors for small infrastructure works in their own neighbourhoods and to drafting of procedures for the award of community contracts. With technical assistance from NHDA, CDCs identified sub-projects, approved engineering designs, and cost estimates; and executed the works by hiring skilled and unskilled labourers from within the same settlement. The process resulted in lower costs and often to improved quality of work, generated employment and built skills of the community members, and increased sustainability of the assets (UNCHS 1993).
Although community contracting entailed lower overheads than work by private construction firms, NHDA incurred hidden costs on staff time for community training, auditing of financial records, and inspections of the construction (United Nations 2005). Subsequently, the community contracting procedures were institutionalised and promoted through programmes associated to the government's broad pro-poor policies (Jayaratne 1996) .
The community contract system was introduced in Tanzania in 1993, followed by its adoption in Namibia for the "Build Together" project; DFID funded pilot projects in India and by the governments in Zambia and Bolivia. More recently, community contracts were introduced by UNHabitat in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Maldives for post-disaster housing projects. Under the community empowerment component, the CSP was expected to enable public and private agencies and community groups to implement environmental improvement and investment activities.
Achievements under MHP
After the pilot projects, the operational responsibilities of the CSP were taken over by the Ministry of 
Reversal: 1994 and beyond
In 1994, after being in power for 17 years, the ruling Party lost national elections and the State revoked the enabling policy and processes for housing. The Government once again took on the role of a housing provider, and the single policy for housing was replaced by a piecemeal approach of Ministries and other institutions (Sirivardana 1999) . The use of the CAP methodology was abandoned by NHDA, while CDCs established for the implementation of MHP collapsed after the basic goals were achieved (Russell 2000) , and because of the decline of local and national government interventions in slums (Jayaratne 2005; Sevanatha 1999 ). In the same year, the 1.5 Million Houses and Janasaviya Programmes were phased out (United Nations 2002).
The period 1995-2000 marked a change in Government policy in favour of direct provision of housing.
In 1995, Janaudana -a national housing programme that focussed on lower and lower middle income groups was introduced. By May 1996, the total number of housing units in Sri Lanka was estimated at 3.9 million of which 18 percent were in urban areas and 74 percent in rural areas. About 41.88 per cent of the rural housing stock was permanent, 51.65 percent are semi-permanent and 6.47 percent were improvised (United Nations 2000).
In 1996, the Government geared the policy to meet the expanding housing demand and for improving the quality of substandard housing. The goal was to promote self-help initiatives and mobilise the potential of private developers through: i) extending assistance to low income families to build new houses or upgrade their own houses, and ii) undertaking special housing projects to relocate slum and shanty squatters.
Although the MHP and the enabling approach were suspended, the "direct transfer of experience" to other countries occurred "through staff secondment from UNCHS (Habitat)" (Huchzermeyer 2003) , and through individuals (who are no longer associated with NHDA) working on donor-funded projects. The "People's Process" was introduced for housing programmes in Namibia (by For the first project, REEL identified land at the periphery of Colombo for relocating families from 13 different locations. Sahaspura, the planning of which did not adopt the CAP process, comprises of 13 storied high-rise apartment blocks with 671 apartments of between 28 to 56 square meters area (Hettige 2004) , and commercial and recreational facilities. Relocated residents were to pay a one time deposit of SLR 25,000 with Sanasa Bank at the time of occupying the new apartment. The interest from the deposits was earmarked for maintenance costs and common area utility (Wickrema 2005 (Hettige 2004 ) that highlight lack of residents' involvement during the planning process and non-integration of lessons learned under the MHP. By July 2008, 376 households had made "unauthorised changes", including structural and facade changes (Mirihagalle, undated) . Subsequently, REEL is to build four-storied walk-up apartments of 46.6 square metres with 2 bedrooms. The regulation for four-storied houses have been modified to enable construction of 32 feet high blocks, and reduce the apartment height by 2 feet to enable construction of more flats.
The above illustrates that despite the experiences under MHP, REEL developed the resettlement scheme without consultations with the residents. REEL decided to provide houses that better met people's needs and introduced regulatory changes to increase densities only when faced with rejection of the small apartments and associated problems. This highlights the focus of professionals and the public sector on costs and physical redevelopment, and the lack of internalisation of the benefits of participatory approaches. The above show the funding/ managing organisations did not adopt CAP for relocation of the poor in the first instance. They adopted the process and changed the housing options for the households after initial problems were identified or faced. Further, the processes followed under the REEL programme and SUF pilot are likely to demonstrate significant differences in the outcomes of projects compared to achievements under MHP.
Conclusions
The MHP was a great success in the 1980s and a leading example for other developing countries. The enabling approach of MHP was strengthened through: i) decentralised implementation; ii) technical support for planning; iii) implementation guidelines; iv) financial support for different housing options, and v) training and formation of new cadres of officials. However, the momentum for implementing the MHP decelerated at a rapid pace as involvement of key decision-makers in monitoring and managing the programme reduced. Further, since the CDCs were considered politicised, MHP was phased out with the change in Government.
The processes under MHP and the subsequent housing activities in Sri Lanka reveal that the onus for implementing 'sustainable housing projects' lies with the planners, facilitators (social, community and technical) and the technical advisers. Thus, actors who fund housing and slum upgrading programmes or projects need to assess the lessons learnt on such programmes and earlier experiences. However, in the absence of a contemporary nationwide housing policy and coordinated approach, the new programmes and projects have all been short-term. In spite of the promising experiences under the MHP, people were not involved in planning the new apartment blocks. REEL went through the cycle of constructing 'modern and compact' apartments and experiencing problems in meeting its objectives. This reveals the unidirectional focus on commercial development of land and inadequate attention to the needs of the households. More attention for self-help and incremental housing could help to bring state housing policy closer to the people's needs.
As already identified under the MHP, successful implementation of national programmes require policy changes, technical support, a systematic approach to implementation, flexibility amongst partners at higher levels of decision-making, and partnerships amongst political decision makers, professionals and NGOs. It also requires informal arrangements at the field level for the facilitators to respond to local needs and situations, and identify opportunities to resolve problems in a pragmatic way. Capacity building activities are not an end in themselves but a means for identifying and tackling problems, development of toolkits, and in-depth documentation of the processes.
While community participation and self help housing are promoted by donor agencies, the NHDA and REEL are no longer promoting self-help housing strategies. In Colombo, where REEL has adopted a strategy for relocating slum and shanty dwellers in medium and high density housing, the STP has frozen in-situ development in high land value settlements and has undermined the process of self-help (Wakely 2008 ).
